Microeconomics

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Market Structure: Monopoly



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Introduction

- Monopoly is a market structure in which a single seller of a product with no close substitutes serves the entire market.
- The key feature that differentiates the monopoly from the competitive firm is the price elasticity of demand facing the firm.
 - In perfect competition the price elasticity of demand faced by the firm is infinite: a slight rise causes loss of all sales.
 - A monopoly has significant control over the market price.
- In practice it is usually difficult to identify and define a monopoly (DuPont example):
 - Competition authorities usually use Hehrfindal Index of Market Concentration and cross-price elasticity of demand to measure market power.

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Sources of Monopoly I

1 Exclusive Control over Important Inputs

 A prominent example: DeBeers Diamond Mines' control over most of the world's supply of raw diamonds.



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- 2 Economies of Scale




Figure: Natural Monopoly

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Sources of Monopoly II

3 Patents

Most countries protect inventions through some sort of patent system. A patent typically confers the right to exclusive benefit from all exchanges involving the invention to which it applies.

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- Cost: Creation of a monopoly leads to inefficiency.
- Benefit: Gives incentive to innovate.

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4 Network Economies

- In many markets, a product becomes more valuable as greater numbers of consumers use it.
- Example: Peer-to-peer downloading, Windows and many more.
- Network economies work similarly to economies of scale (as in case of Windows)

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
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5 Government Licenses

• Example: 3G auctions, licenses to restaurants in airports.

Profit Maximization of a Monopoly I

The Monopolist's Total Revenue Curve



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Profit Maximization of a Monopoly II

Optimality Condition

A monopolist maximizes profit by choosing the level of output where marginal revenue equals marginal cost

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- The crucial difference to perfect competition is that the price is no longer constant but specified by demand: P(Q)
- Total revenue:

 $TR = P(Q) \cdot Q$

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Total revenue:

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
Marginal revenue:

$$MR = \frac{\partial TR}{\partial Q} = \frac{\partial (P(Q) \cdot Q)}{\partial Q} = P\left(1 + \frac{Q}{P}\frac{\partial P}{\partial Q}\right) = P\left(1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon}\right)$$

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Profit Maximization of a Monopoly III

Changes in TR resulting from a price cut:




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Profit Maximization of a Monopoly IV


Marginal Revenue and position on the Demand Curve:



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Profit Maximization of a Monopoly V

Marginal Revenue and Elasticity of Demand:



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At which point is the profit maximized?

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Profit Maximization of a Monopoly VI

- Marginal Revenue with Linear Demand:
 - Demand:

$$P = a - bQ$$

Total Revenue:

$$TR = P(Q) \cdot Q = (a - bQ) \cdot Q = aQ - bQ^2$$


Marginal Revenue:

$$MR = \frac{\partial TR}{\partial Q} = a - 2bQ$$

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Profit Maximization of a Monopoly VII

A Profit-Maximizing Output Graphically:



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The Profit–Maximizing Mark–Up

Recall the optimality condition:

$$MR = MC$$

Recall the relationship between the price and the marginal revenue:


$$MR = P\left(1 + \frac{1}{\varepsilon}\right) = P\left(1 - \frac{1}{|\varepsilon|}\right)$$

Combining the two yields the mark-up over the cost:

$$\frac{P - MC}{P} = \frac{1}{|\varepsilon|}$$

E.g. if the price elasticity of demand facing a monopolist were equal to -2, the profit-maximizing markup would be 1, which implies that the profit-maximizing price is twice marginal cost.

The Monopolist's Shut–Down Condition




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Price Discrimination I

Sales in Two Different Markets




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Price Discrimination II

First-Degree (Perfect) Price Discrimination




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Price Discrimination III


Second-Degree Price Discrimination



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Welfare–Loss from Single Price Monopoly



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Public Policy Toward Natural Monopoly I

1 State Ownership and Management

- Efficiency requires that price be equal to marginal cost.
- For natural monopoly, marginal cost is below average total cost.
- An option for getting around this is to have the state take over the industry.
- Virtue: Government is not bound, the way a private firm is, to earn at least a normal profit.

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■ Vice: Weak incentives for cost-conscious, efficient management.

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- Vice: Weak incentives for cost-conscious, efficient management.

2 State Regulation of Private Monopolies

- Leave ownership in private hands, while providing guide- lines or regulations that limit pricing discretion.
- For instance: Private companies that provide electricity, water, and telephone service.
- Leads to over-investment in capital and cross-subsidizing.

Public Policy Toward Natural Monopoly II

3 Exclusive Contracting for Natural Monopoly

- Though cost conditions may dictate that a market be served by a single supplier...
- ...there can still be competition to see who gets to be that supplier.
- Call for private companies to submit bids to supply the service. And the lowest bidder would then get the contract.
- Vices: May lead to corruption, requires extremely detailed contracts that are indistinguishable from direct control.

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4 Enforcement of Anti–Trust Laws

- Rules that prohibit mergers between competing companies whose combined market share would exceed some predetermined fraction of total industry output.
- Should be applied to prevent only those mergers where significant cost savings would not be realized.
- Again a problem of defining markets and market shares.

Public Policy Toward Natural Monopoly III

5 Do Nothing – Laissez–Faire Policy

- Obvious fairness and efficiency problems.
- Allow price discrimination for efficiency purposes.
- Fairness: where do the profits actually go? They usually are redistributed in taxes!